Monday, November 14, 2011

Some conclusions for a program towards Market Socialism


Hello reader:

I have some conclusions to make from my lecture of the articles about marksoc until this point. They are spearheaded by the quick changes that many developed nations are experiencing in 2011, from the fed up population of the United States and its Occupy Wall Street  movement (read this) to the crumbling of the monetary union in Europe. I based these ideas on this article by Schweickart, and added my own.

First: To produce a global change in the status quo, we need before to change the situation on our countries.

Second: Currently, under capitalist democracy in its variants, we need to create the institutions necessary for  the transition towards marksoc.  We cannot wait for an uprising or for the situation to become dire.  These institutions will become invaluable during or after the economic crash. 

Third (first in importance): We no longer work on a theoretical construct to prove a theoretical point, now we work towards a model for praxis, to show how we want the world to be.  This also means finding practical solutions for "small" real-world problems.  
The following example is not as trivial as it seems: there is a small bookstore shop.  The owner works all day, more than 60 hours per week in the shop, but wants some free time.  Hired employees require constant supervision, since their interest clash with those of the shop owner, and for a small business they are costly (wages and taxes).  How can this shop become a micro-cooperative without the original owner taking a big hit on his income? What strategy can we suggest so a partnership can be made, to have as a result two happy new cooperativists instead of an over-worked capitalist owner with one employee?  Find the answer to this example, and a big part of the issues regarding the adoption of marksoc by the general population will be solved.
Fourth: We will not permanently win hearts and minds with a shocking  revolution.  The economic violence against the majority, however grave, cannot be destroyed with physical violence.  If we are right, cooperative companies as a whole will supersede their capitalist counterparts because they are better, more efficient, more responsive to the demands of society.  If the game is rigged and tweaked, it means that not all the rules are against us.  We beat the current system with more democracy, not less.  In this way, change will become permanent, as "natural" as capitalism felt until now.
  
We still need to discuss the details.  As we saw in the last posts, some of the important issues to decide upon include:
  • the degree (or possibility) of control of investment by the State,
  • the degree (or possibility) on which the State can function as an employer of last resort,
  • surprisingly, for some authors such as Schweickart we need to include in the system the possibility of allowing small and even grand capitalists to continue developing companies.
I will try to speed-up my reviews of articles about marksoc, and you reader will need to ask me questions and posit answers to make me run faster towards the objective.  We need to start somewhere.
Bibliography
SCHWEICKART, David (2006):  "Economic Democracy: A Worthy Socialism that Would Work", Presentation at the Book Launching of "Derecho a Decidir: Propuestas para el socialismo del siglo XXI", ed. Joaquin Arriola.

For the accumulated Bibliography and the Glossary please click here

Monday, October 24, 2011

Investment in David Schweickart´s "Economic Democracy" (Part 2)

Welcome back.  In this post I will continue analyzing the way on which investment is funded and distributed in David Schweickart`s model of market socialism, denominated Economic Democracy (ED).  

As we saw in my last post, the system of funding in ED consist in a general tax over the capital assets of companies; the resultant income is later distributed by the state to a myriad of “social banks”.  Schweickart itself recognized in his book "After Capitalism" (2002) the possibility of a system of "laissez-faire" marksoc, but preferred to develop a system of banks that would invest in cooperative companies based in social goals, especially to reach full employment.  This alternative laissez-faire system would be structured in the following way: 

Banks would be charged a centrally determined interest rate on the funds they receive. They would be expected to make a profit, that is, to charge more than the baserate interest, adjusted according to risk. Bank officials, who are public officials, would be paid in accordance with performance. Banks would compete, as they do now, trying to balance the riskiness of their loans against the interest rates they charge. As under capitalism, managers of successful banks (i.e., the most profitable) would be rewarded, managers whose banks performed poorly would be sacked. In all cases, bank profits are returned to the national investment fund. (p.49)

For the author of this blog, this system constitutes a mix between what I call pure marksoc and Economic Democracy, since in the later banks are managed by public officials and not by its own workers, and the State controls part of the economy through its management of the "investment fund".  We should remember that in Economic Democracy the workers are not owners of their companies, which belong to all of society. Workers cannot sell the capital stock and use the resultant money as income. 

Let me describe some positive aspects of the ED proposition.  In ED investment is proportionally allocated among regions according to their population.  Following neo-classical economic theory, this allocation would be clearly inefficient, since profitable companies could lack access to funds while less profitable ones could receive them because of their location.  Bruno Jossa (2004) is right to point that labour also moves between regions (albeit more slowly than capital), thus we could see a population movement towards those regions where the returns to capital are higher.  Per-capita allocation of investment can mitigate the concentration effect, and it is based in the principle of fairness.  Being that in ED there is not interest earned for personal savings, the mechanism of tax over the capital stock of companies and fair redistribution of investment avoids the “problem of austerity” of capitalism, because S(avings) can then be equal to I(nvestment) with some slight manipulations.  Jossa argues that in ED we can dispense through the fiscal system with both “Keynesian” and even structural unemployment.

Public ownership and social investment constitute “protective” measures that show an overwhelming preoccupation about the possible destruction of companies and the increase of unemployment, preoccupation proper of developed service economies such as the United States.  In my opinion the gains in efficiency (and happiness) due to real ownership far outweigh the potential costs of the destruction and reconstruction of companies (still, in a mixed system where cooperatives and capitalist companies cohabit, this means that we could see our hopes for the establishment of marksoc dashed by the degradation of cooperatives and their eventual transformation in capitalist companies). 

Jossa agrees that banks should be cooperatives in themselves which can pursue profits, but desires to maintain the per-capita basis of the tax funds`distribution.  He also sustains that granting interest for personal savings (in the form of government bonds) is not a problem in an economy where workers are also company owners.  Jossa recognizes that letting the banks choose companies according to expected returns on their loans could greatly reduce the available funds for the creation of new cooperatives.  However, it is important to note that there is an intrinsic limit to the size of a cooperative company (depending on the sector).  This fact lets horizontal spaces to be filled by new potential enterprises in a specific market, existing also an interest on the cooperatives`side to spur other companies to work with along the production chain, in the way a federation does.

I think that is important to differentiate between complete ideal models such as ED and the possibilities of reality, shaped by political conflict and power struggles.  The conceptual transition from capitalism to pure marksoc, given its similitudes to libertarianism and other “free-market” philosophies, seems to be easier than the transition towards ED at this moment (2011). The most important problem to solve, if we are going to take the pure road to a marksoc system, is how we are going to facilitate the necessary funds for the establishment of the required thousands of new cooperative companies.  If we are right, with minor adjustments our system can quickly supersede the current “capitalism of chaos and friends in high places” (how else can it be described?) and from there further changes towards fairness can be implemented.  Am I too timid to make revolutionary changes?  We should discuss then the desirability of more involvement of the State in the structure of investment, the fairness principle in investment distribution, and the future effects this can have in the environment and personal happiness.  Fire away.

Bibliography

JOSSA, Bruno (2004): "Book Review: Schweickart and Economic Democracy", Review of Radical Political  Economics (36), pp. 546-561.
SCHWEICKART, David (2002):  "After Capitalism", Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

For the accumulated Bibliography and the Glossary please click here

Sunday, October 2, 2011

Investment in David Schweickart´s "Economic Democracy" (Part I)

Welcome back.
 
First, I want to give a hint to everybody.  If you like to study a subject, but you don´t have enough time (and money) to do it, a simple equipment upgrade can make wonders.  I recently bought a popular e-book reader, converted some of the PDFs of my extensive marksoc bibliography and uploaded them to the little machine.  The change in my disposition to read and the rate at which I can comment on articles and write posts based on them is nothing short of astonishing. Do not attempt to read articles in your computer.  You can print the articles (bad for nature, expensive and a pain in the head when you want to copy your notes into an usable digital format), or you go the e-book reader path.  Notes made to articles this way cannot yet be shared with other readers in the way is done in Google Docs, but it is only a matter of time until e-book readers can properly manage readable PDFs  in their native format, or export documents with their remarks in the right place, including highlighting and notes, and from there to a full collaborative effort there is only one small step.

Second, from now on  I will add a link to a Glossary and Bibliography post at the end of each new entry, so those of you new to the concepts in this blog can catch up, and the rest can have a long and nice list of articles to peruse and help with this project.

Third, today´s post! The theme of the current post is a central element in David Schweickart´s model of woc-marksoc that I previously misunderstood.  A marksoc model consist in three parts: a free market, more democratic companies, and a more democratic way of allocating investment.  The first one is implied in marksoc (is part of the name).  The second one is the core of the woc-marksoc model, since cooperatives are expected to be more democratic than their capitalist counterpart.  The third point, however, can be achieved in varied ways, ranging from social planning to private profit-driven investment.  It was my view that in marksoc, cooperatives would be financed by banks that would constitute cooperatives in themselves, which would be guided by profit to make the best possible choices between the companies (existing or future) competing for its funds.  However, according to Schweickart this is not the case.

Schweickart sustains that one of the main problems of capitalism is the dependence on "investors confidence". Capitalism needs continuous growth to work.  There needs to be an increase in consumption to convince private investors that there will be profits to be made at the end of the road.  Any bumps can be translated by some into a pessimistic outlook, and "their pessimism becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy" (Schweickart, 2008).  Then, decreasing investment means higher unemployment, which it means less aggregated demand, and there we are, trapped in a downward spiral (as an example, the current situation in the United States described here).  Now, in woc-marksoc we have a built-in corset for those people that own companies: they work there too, and they will be averse to act against their own workplace, so if they are not confident enough in the future to re-invest their earnings into new technology or an expansion, they will nevertheless look to maintain themselves occupied because they are the people on the line of fire.  I am sure that most folks do not like to commit economic "suicide".

But what about outside investors in marksoc?  Namely, those that can make the initial "investment" in the form of a loan or grant?  If those investors are cooperative banks, they must also be reticent to stop all their activity, because they must keep the bank running to obtain profits.  Closing the bank to do other stuff with the money would not work, since ownership is distributed between every employee involved.  But we cannot ensure that cooperative banks will use its funds to make loans to cooperative companies, instead of choosing other investment paths that could generate higher earnings.  Unless we make them do exactly that through regulation, of course.

The solution that Schweickart provides is to bring financial markets "under conscious collective control".  How does he plans to do that?  Exacting a tax on cooperative companies, which the State will later redistribute to social banks based on the population of each region of a country (per-capita basis).  I let him to explain here how this redistribution system would work:

These funds are then distributed to local and regional investment banks —public banks—charged with loaning them out to individuals and enterprises needing funds to start up, upgrade, or expand business operations. Loan applications are judged in terms of projected profitability, employment creation, and, if the community so desires, environment enhancement.
Loan officers are public officials, democratically accountable, charged with effectively allocating the funds entrusted to them. If their loan portfolios perform poorly, they can be discharged.
In this way, investment would be divorced from these harmful "animal spirits" that cannot agree in taking the economy out of the dump when the free market mechanism fails.  But can we still talk about market when investment is not guided by companies (banks) making independent decisions?  Let´s say that job creation is a decisive element to decide the continuity of a loan officer.  Should this officer benefit companies creating lots of low-paying jobs over companies creating fewer high-quality jobs?  Who decides if an investment portfolio has performed poorly? The State, the citizens of the region, or the employees of the particular bank?  And what does poorly means in this context?

There are many details to work on: first, we have the big choice between cooperative banks and "social banks", then the issue of the system of redistribution of funds gained through taxes over the capital stock of cooperative companies, and finally the criteria utilized to distribute these loans between producer cooperatives (which, again, in Schweickart´s system are not like regular loans, more about this in my next post).  Personally, I prefer a woc-marksoc system comprised exclusively of companies owned by their own workers, guided by their own interests (always under the law), with supporting government agencies that can bankroll investment in certain areas according to motives other than profits.  It seems that I will have a hard time letting go of my free market approach to the issue.

I will stop here, since the article I used as a base doesn't get much further.  In my next post I will be exploring ideas about investment under the guidance of an article written by Bruno Jossa that lingers on this very issue (see Bibliography below).  Please add any ideas that you can have about this, the comments box is below for you to use it.  See you next time (soon).

Bibliography

JOSSA, Bruno (2004): "Book Review: Schweickart and Economic Democracy", Review of Radical Political  Economics (36), pp. 546-561.
SCHWEICKART, David (2008): "Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?", Beijing Forum: The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All -The Universal Value and the Development Trend of Civilization.

For the accumulated Bibliography and the Glossary please click here 

Accumulated Glossary and Bibliography

Glossary

BI - Basic Income. 

ED - Economic Democracy, system designed by David Schweickart.
I - Investment.
KOF - Capital Owned Firm.
LMF - Labour Managed Firm.  
marksoc - Market Socialism
(pure) marksoc - Pure Market Socialism (Vanek, Ward).  Free market of good and services with competition between cooperative companies, capital is not controlled by the State.
MAW - Maximum Allowable Personal Wealth (R. George)

S - Savings.
UGI - Universal Guaranteed Income (R. George)
woc-marksoc - "Worker-Owned Companies" Market Socialism



Bibliography utilized:

BUNGE, Mario (1998): Social Science under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective, University of Toronto Press Incorporated.

ERRASTI A., BRETOS I., and NUNEZ A. (2017). "The viability of cooperatives: The fall of the Mondragon cooperative Fagor". Review of Radical Political Economics, First Published February 2, 2017.

JOSSA, Bruno (2004): "Book Review: Schweickart and Economic Democracy", Review of Radical Political  Economics (36), pp. 546-561.

KALMI, Panu (2003): “The Study of Co-operatives in Modern Economics: A Methodological Essay, Helsinki School of Economics Working Paper No. 351.

MILL, John Stuart (1848, revised 1852): Principles of Political Economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy. Book IV,Chapter 7. John W.Parker, London. 

NAYERI, Kamram (2003): "Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists (book review)", Review of Radical Political Economics, 35, pg. 362. 

OLLMAN, Bertell ed. (1998). With SCHWEICKART, David, LAWLER, James, TICKTIN, Hillel (1997): "Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialist". Routledge; 1st edition.

RECTOR, Tully (2021): "Market socialism as a form of life", Review of Social Economy, DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2021.1886319

SCHWEICKART, David (1996): Against Capitalism, Westview Press.

SCHWEICKART, David (2002)After Capitalism, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

SCHWEICKART, David (2006):  "Economic Democracy: A Worthy Socialism that Would Work", Presentation at the Book Launching of "Derecho a Decidir: Propuestas para el socialismo del siglo XXI", ed. Joaquin Arriola.

SCHWEICKART, David (2008): Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?, Beijing Forum: The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All -The Universal Value and the Development Trend of Civilization.
  
WESTRA, Richard (2008): "Economic Life Beyond Capital" (review of books), Review of Radical Political Economics, 40, pp. 354-363.

WOLFF, Richard (2012): Democracy at Work: A Cure for Capitalism. Haymarket Books. 
 


Bibliography from articles ("the Utopia List"):
 
   Here I will include bibliography that appeared in the articles utilized to write my posts, but that I still haven´t got to use.  With time, these items will be copied to the upper section (meaning that they have been read, analyzed, and discussed).  In the end I hope that all existent articles about Market Socialism can be found in this page and constitute a more or less complete reference list about the subject.  If my blog comes to nothing, the least I can do is to compile a list of material for other people to make Utopian dreams come true.

Aspromourgos, T. 2000. Is an employer-of-last-resort sustainable? A review article. Review of Political Economy 12 (2).

Banerjee, Abhijit, Dilip Mookherjee, Kaivan Munshi, and Debraj Ray (2001): 'Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra', Journal of Political Economy, 109 (1): 138-90.

Benham, Lee and Philip Keefer (1991): ‘Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity’, Economic Inquiry, 29: 706-19. 

Ben-Ner, Avner (1988): ‘The Life Cycle of Worker-owned Firms in Market Economies: a Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 10:287-313. 

Blaug, Mark (1998): 'The Problems With Formalism', Challenge, May-June.

Bonin, John P. and Louis Putterman (1987): Economics of Cooperation and the Labor-Managed Economy, New York: Harwood.


Bonin, John P., Derek C. Jones and Louis Putterman (1993): 'Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?' Journal of Economic Literature, 31:1290-1320.


Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis (1996): 'The Distribution of Wealth and the Viability of the Democratic Firm', in Pagano and Rowthorn, 82-97. 
 


Dickinson, H. D. 1933. Price formation in a socialist community. Economic Journal 43 (June).
 

Dobb, M. [1939] 1955a. Economists and the economics of socialism. In On economic theory and socialism. Collected papers, ed. M. Dobb. London: Routledge & Kegan.
[1939] 1955b. A note on saving and investment in a socialist economy. In On economic theory and socialism. Collected papers, ed. M. Dobb. London: Routledge & Kegan.
 [1953] 1955.Areview of the discussion concerning economic calculation in a socialist economy. In Oneconomic theory and socialism. Collected papers, ed. M. Dobb. London: Routledge & Kegan.
1956. Pianificazione. In Dizionario di economia politica. Milan: Comunitá.
1969. Welfare economics and the economics of socialism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, John B., D. Wade Hands, and Uskali Mäki (1998, eds.): The Handbook of Economic Methodology, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Domar, E. D. 1966. The soviet collective farm as a producer cooperative. American Economic Review 56 (4).

Doucouliagos, Chris (1995): 'Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed Firms and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49 (1): 58-77.


Dow, G. 1993. Democracy versus appropriability. Can labour-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world? In Markets and democracy: Participation, accountability and efficiency, ed. S. Bowles, H. Gintis, and B.
Gustafsson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

1998. Review of Jossa & Cuomo, 1997. Journal of Economic Literature 36 (2).
Dow, G., and L. Putterman. 1996. Why capital (usually) hires labour: A review and assessment of some proposed explanations. MIMEO.

Dow, Gregory K. (2003): Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Dow, Sheila C. (2002): Economic Methodology: An Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 
Drèze, J. H. 1989. Labour-management, contracts and capital markets. A general equilibrium approach. Oxford: Blackwell.  
1993. Self-management and economic theory: Efficiency, funding and employment. In Market socialism: The current debate, ed. P. Bardhan and J. E. Roemer. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dubravcic, D. 1970. "Labor as an entrepreneurial input; an essay on the theory of the producer cooperative economy". Economica 37 (147).

Earle, John S. and Estrin, Saul (1996): ‘Employee Ownership in Transition’, in Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (eds): Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, vol. 2: Insiders and the State. Budapest:CEU Press.
 
Elster, J., and K. P. J. Moene, eds. 1989. Alternatives to capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Erlich, A. 1978. Dobb and the Marx-Feldman model: A problem in the soviet economic strategy. Cambridge Journal of Economics 15 (2).


Estrin, S. 1983. Self-management: Economic theory and Yugoslav practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Furubotn, Eirik and Pejovich, Svetozar (1970): 'Property Rights and the Behaviour of the Firm in a Socialist State: the Example of Yugoslavia', Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 30: 430-454. 

Furubotn, Eirik (1976): 'The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An Alternative Interpretation', The American Economic Review, 66: 104-123.

Furubotn, Eirik and Richter, Rudolf (1991): 'The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment', in Furubotn and Richter (eds.), The New Institutional Economics, Tübingen: Mohr, 1-34.

Gintis, H. 1989. Financial markets and the political structure of the enterprises. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 1 (1).


George, Robley E. (2002): Socioeconomic Democracy: An Advanced Socioeconomic System, Wesport, CT: Praeger Paperback, 328 pp.

Hansmann, Henry (1996): The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (1996): 'The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outsider Ownership', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12 (4): 53-69.

Hart, Oliver and
Moore, John (1998): 'Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership', NBER working paper 6421, February.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1988): Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Cambridge: Polity University Press.
  • (1996): 'Organisational Form and Economic Evolution', in Pagano and Rowthorn, 98-115. 
  • (1999): Economics and Utopia: Why the Learning Economy Is Not the End of History, London: Routledge. 

Horvat, Branko (1982): The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory, M.E. Sharpe.
 
Ireland, N. J., and P. J. Law. (1981): "Efficiency, incentives, and individual labor supply in the labor-managed firm". Journal of Comparative Economics 5 (1).

Ireland, Norman J. and Law, Peter J. (1982): The Economics of Labour-Managed Enterprises, London: Croom Helm.

Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H.  (1979): 'Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firm and Codetermination', Journal of Business, 52(4): 469-506.
 
Jossa, B. 2001. L’impresa gestita dai lavoratori e la disoccupazione classica e Keynesiana. Rivista italiana degli economisti, 1, April.
2004. Marx, Marxism and the cooperative movement. Cambridge Journal of Economics.
Jossa, B., and G. Cuomo. 1997. The economic theory of socialism and the labour-managed firm. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Kaldor, N. 1972. The irrelevance of equilibrium economics. Economic Journal 82 (December).
 

Kornai, J. 1992. The socialist system: The political economy of communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Meade, James E. (1972): ‘The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit-Sharing’, Economic Journal 82: 402-28.

Meade, J. E. 1972. "The theory of labour-managed firms and of profit sharing". Economic Journal Suppl. No. 82 (March).
1979. "The adjustment processes of labor cooperatives with constant returns to scale and perfect competition". Economic Journal 89 (December).
Mygind, N. 1997. Employee ownership in Baltic countries. In Privatisation surprises in transition economies: Employee ownership in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. M. Uvalic and D. Vaugham-Whitehead. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
1962a. Squilibri economici e pianificazione in Italia. La Rivista Trimestrale 2 (June). 
1962b. Mercato, pianificazione e imprenditorialità. La Rivista Trimestrale 3 (September).
Nuti, D. M. 1978. Investment, interest and degree of centralization in Maurice Dobb’s theory of socialist economy. Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (2).

Pagano, Ugo and Rowthorn, Robert (1996, eds): Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise, London: Routledge.

Pencavel, John (2001): Worker Participation: Lessons from the Worker Co-ops of the Pacific Northwest, New York: Russell Sage.

Perkins, Albert (1995): 'Cooperative Economics: An Interview With Jaroslav Vanek', New Renaissance Magazine, 5(1), available also at http://www.ru.org/51cooper.html 

Pica, F. 2000. Per un federalismo municipalista (I principi: il federalismo e la costituzione italiana). In Teoria e fatti del federalismo fiscale, ed. D. Fausto and F. Pica. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino.


Pittatore, Silvia and Turati, Gilberto (2000): ‘A Map of Property Rights in Italy and the Case of Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis of Hansmann’s Theory’, Economic Analysis: Journal of Enterprise and Participation, 3(1): 23-48.

Putterman, L. 1993. After the employment relation. In Markets and democracy: Participation, accountability and efficiency, ed. S. Bowles, H. Gintis, and B. Gustafsson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Prychitko, David (1996): 'The Critique of Workers' Self-Management: Austrian Perspectives and Economic Theory', Advances in Austrian Economics, 3

Rey Patrick and Tirole, Jean (2000): 'Loyalty and Investment in Cooperatives', mimeo, University of Social  Sciences, Toulouse.

Rey, Patrick and
Tirole, Jean (2001): 'Financing and Access in Cooperatives', mimeo, University of Social Sciences, Toulouse. 

Roemer, J. E. 1992. The morality and efficiency of market socialism. Ethics 102. Reprinted in J. E. Roemer, Egalitarian perspectives; essays in philosophical economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Economic Press, 1994.

1994. On public ownership. In Egalitarian perspectives; essays in philosophical economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Economic Press.
Rusmich, Ladislav & Sachs, Stephen M. (2003): Lessons from the Failure of the Communist Economic System, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 380 pp.


Schweickart, D. 1993. Against capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
1998. Market socialism; a defense. In Market socialism; the debate among socialists, ed. B. Ollman.London: Routledge.
Sen, Amartya K. (1966): ’Labour Allocation in a Co-operative Enterprise’, Review of Economic Studies, 33: 361-71.
 
Stephen, F. H. 1984. The economic analysis of producers’ cooperatives. London: Macmillan.

Thomas, H., and C. Logan. 1982. Mondragon; an economic analysis. London: Allen & Unwin.


Tortia, Ermanno (2002): The Internal Organisation of Labour Managed Firms: The Problem of Value Added Distribution and of Capital Accumulation, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ferrara.
 
Vanek, J. 1970. The general theory of labor-managed market economies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
 
Vanek, Jaroslav (1971): The Participatory Economy: An Evolutionary Hypothesis and a Strategy for Development, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.


Vanek, Jaroslav (1975): Self-Management: Economic Liberation of Man, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.


von Mises, L. [1932] 1981. Socialism; an economic and sociological analysis. Engl. translation. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ward, Benjamin (1958): 'The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism', American Economic Review, 48: 566-89.

Still Not In Proper Order, will be shortly:


Mäki, Uskali (1998): 'Realisticness', in Davis, Hands and Mäki, 409-13.Morduch, Jonathan (1999): ‘The Microfinance Promise’, Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (4): 1569-634.
Schotter, Andrew (1997): Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Steinherr, Alfred and Jean-Jacques Thisse (1979): ‘Are Labour-Managers Really Perverse?’, Economics Letters, 2: 137-43.
Jean (1999): ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?’, Econometrica, 67 (4): 741-81.
Tirole, Jean (2001): ‘Corporate Governance’, Econometrica, 69 (1): 1-35. 

Torgerson, Randall E., Bruce J. Reynolds, and Thomas W. Gray (1998): ‘Evolution of Cooperative Thought, Theory and Purpose’, Journal of Cooperatives 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press.

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

From Market Socialism to Technoholodemocracy

Before we continue, let´s analyze a definition of Market Socialism, the one provided by Wikipedia, the example of non-profit collaborative effort in the Internet, as of today: 
Market socialism refers to various economic systems where the means of production are publicly owned, managed and operated for a profit in a market economy. The profit generated in a market socialist system would be used to directly remunerate employees or go toward public finance. Theoretically, the fundamental difference between a traditional socialist economy and a market socialist economy is the existence of a market for the means of production and capital goods under market socialism.
It is correct to affirm that marksoc refers to various proposed economic systems, since each author interested seems to have his own variation, but all hover around a central theme.  The Wikipedian definition centers too much in the "market" aspect of marksoc, and this is understandable, because the existence of a free market is what differentiates this system from Central Planned Socialism, the commonly known type of socialism of which we had real-life examples in the 20th Century.

However, the definition translates the "socialist" part of the equation directly into the words "the means of production are publicly owned".  This mistaken phrase derivate from the description of Capitalism as a system where the means of production are privately owned without referencing the rationale behind the right of the owners to receive profits.   As we know, profits are the reward received for a successful investment (of capital), regardless of the amount of work that the investor personally contributed (or not) to produce those profits.  Without this consideration, the opposition to Capitalism appears to be the opposition to the private character of ownership, when in fact Socialist advocates want to distribute the fruits of labor in a different manner than the typical Capitalist configuration of rents for resources; wages for workers; and  profits for investors.   In the case of  market socialism, ownership can be public (at community or State level) or private (the workers are owners), but the product or service will always be gauged in the market, and the profits will not be paid to non-working private investors.  This being said, it is common to understand private ownership as being equivalent to capitalist ownership when we include the concept of “wages” in the same discussion, but I prefer to maintain a clear set of definitions to prevent mistakes (such as conflating public with a collective, or a private cooperative with the commons).

As we saw in my last post, David Schweickart differentiates between marksoc and a specific kind of which he (and me) is partisan: “worker-self-managed” market socialism.  We will call this particular version woc-marksoc (Worker-Owned-Companies´ Market Socialism), since ownership will mostly imply that the workers manage their own work process.   

The main characteristics of this system can be resumed as follows:
  •  Each company is owned by the people working on them.  They manage the company and decide how to distribute the income of the company net of production costs, excepting wages, which are now included in the net income with the profits, since workers will receive both. 
  • Companies compete with each other in a free market of good and services.  
  • The State mediates in the cases of market failure, and helps to create new companies through the financial system, composed of banks that are cooperatives in themselves.  The State can also own companies.  

The positive (and negative) effects of this system will be throroughly analyzed in this blog, but we can already visualize the most obvious of them: an increase in competition under a woc-marksoc scheme will spur innovation and decrease unemployment; self-management will improve workers` satisfaction and self-worth;  the resultant reduction of inequality could greatly reduce violent crime, class discrimination, and even divorce (since most of it has economic roots).

Once done the conceptual jump towards a system that can supersede capitalism, there is only one way to go, and it is forward.  The Argentine-Canadian intellectual Mario Bunge takes woc-marksoc as a base for a more comprehensive system which would include not only the economic facet of social life but also the biologic, cultural and environmental aspects of society. Bunge calls this starting point “authentic socialism”, a system on which the means of production, commerce and credit are cooperatively owned, and on which there is full democracy in the workplace.  This is closer to my conception of woc-marksoc than the generally accepted convention of socialism as a classless society with collective ownership.  However, he finds this “authentic socialism” to be desirable but insufficient, since ignores the necessity of national and international-level cooperation between companies alongside regulated competition, doesn't occupy itself with the State`s inherent tasks (security, health, etc.) and it is limited to the particular economic sphere of social life.  Instead of the particular addition of economic democracy to an already existing system of political democracy, Bunge proposes an expanded kind called “technoholodemocracy”.


In his words, this technoholodemocracy is “the equality of opportunities through biologic equality (sex and race), participative democracy, cooperative ownership, self-management, technical skills and the free access to culture” (Bunge, 1998, p. 435, my translation from Spanish version).  It is a “qualified equality”, a balanced mix between equality and meritocracy (see here).  I suspect that Bunge wants to somehow eliminate the pervasive problem of inter-generational social and cultural capital, which depends on established relationships that act as a ceiling for those people that cannot participate in the right social circles.  After all, many of the richest cooperatives in a woc-marksoc system would probably be populated by those professionals that already have an edge in current capitalism, letting those below them in a better position than before but still without clear possibilities of progress related to potential individual capabilities, meaning that each person would still suffer or gain according to his previous social connections and access to culture. Technoholodemocracy also addresses a problem that I tend to disregard too quickly: even woc competition cannot ensure that environmental degradation will stop without a collective effort.  In his words: “we need a social or controlled market rather than the free market”.  He asserts that this can be achieved with a relatively small State, since full employment, cultural access and autonomous and voluntary organizations would make a large bureaucracy mostly irrelevant, letting to the State the task of coordinating the system.  It almost sounds like the wet dream of both communists and libertarians, without being any of them.


This Utopian exercise is fun and useful to determinate where we want to go in the end, but we must come back to the practical problems at hands´ distance.  We must analyze all possible issues to be presented against our woc-marksoc model and we must find ways to foster the transition to that system without any kind of magic revolution.  Given the current turbulent economic and political juncture, it is our task as intellectuals to be ready when the time comes, because it seems more than ever that elite and the masses will be looking for an answer, and we must be there with the “book” in our hands to gave everybody a chance, to put society in the safe path of Democracy and far away of any tempting authoritarian solution that could lead society into chaos.


Bibliography
BUNGE, Mario (1998): “Social Science under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective”, University of Toronto Press Incorporated.

Monday, July 18, 2011

How I found Market Socialism and became a Wikipedian

Note for the initiated Market Socialist: the following post could appear basic and introductory, and that was its purpose.  I think that it is nevertheless informative and it can promote discussion and raise questions between many readers.  I hope that in the future I can stir your curiosity with advanced points, but to run, I must first learn how to walk.  Thank you for your patience. 

I always suspected that capitalism had some dark issues under its rug.  And living in a developing country it was very easy to see the failings of the system.  Growing up in Latin America, the gap between the haves and the have-nots is so obvious that I started wondering about it from a young age.  Some people will be convinced that inequality is the result of a meritocratic system firmly in place that rewards the intelligent and the productive (and they like to think that they are part of that group).  I tend  to think that most of us, however, can see that rewards and labor are not correlated, that the distribution of the profits generated by work is skewed towards some individuals that do not participate in the actual effort to produce them. You don´t need to read Marx to understand that some serious corrections to the way on which our current economic system works is needed to make the most of our short lives.  So where is the solution? If you are reading this you are not new to the question.  It had been the quest of my life to try to find the best answer possible, the one that we can implement to see results in this Century.

In the yearly years of this decade, after many university courses on Political Economy, and discussions about Marxism and Neo-Classic economists, I stumbled upon a book by David Schweickart that changed my academic life.  The book was called "Against Capitalism", and presented in its first chapters a well-thought account of the many reasons to replace Capitalism with a better system, with economic and ethical arguments to prove the point.  I was flabbergasted, since I felt that finally somebody gave me the tools to counter-attack the common rhetoric shields utilized by the apologists of the system, and that even had the audacity to present an alternative that solved the problems related to innovation and fairness in the archaic socialist models.  What was not to love about that?  Quickly I decided to look more into the subject, and then I found myself deep into a myriad of possible forms of the organization of the economy under democratic principles. However, without a comparison between them and with many schools of thought utilized in their construction, the well-intended ideas seemed more like an abstract cloud of goodwill than a coherent whole that could be put into practice.

For starters, the Wikipedia page on the subject was completely inadequate, and after more than three years since created it looked like this:

Wikipedia version of "Market Socialism" as of 13:55, 12 April 2005

Market socialism is an attempt by a Soviet-style economy to introduce market elements into its economic system to improve economic growth. It was first attempted during the 1920s in the Soviet Union as NEP, or the New Economic Policy, but soon abandoned. Later, elements of "market socialism" were introduced in Hungary (where it was nicknamed "goulash socialism"), Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (see Titoism) in the 1970s and 1980s. Modern Vietnam and Laos also describe themselves as market socialist systems. The Soviet Union attempted to introduce a market socialist system with its perestroika reforms under Mikhael Gorbachev prior to the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
Historically, market socialist systems attempt to retain government ownership of the "commanding heights of the economy" such as heavy industry, energy, and infrastructure, while introducing decentralised decision making and giving local managers more freedom to make decisions and respond to market demands. Market socialist systems also allow private ownership and entrepreneurship in the service and other secondary economic sectors. The market is allowed to determine prices for consumer goods and agricultural products and farmers and sometimes other producers are allowed to sell all or some of their products on the open market and keep some or all of the profit as an incentive to increased and improved production.
However, the Chinese experience with market socialism is another situation. The system introduced in the People's Republic of China by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and has evolved into what some economists, outside of China, would argue is modern Chinese capitalism. See Socialism with Chinese characteristics.

From this definition we are able to understand that marksoc include decentralization and it is a different system than central planning.  There is also the hint that the system could be more efficient than it, but there is no clue about how it would fare against capitalism.  At this point, I felt that I could add to the wikipedian process by integrating into the article the version that Schweickart was advancing in his book.  This led to a lengthy discussion with fellow editors, antagonistic about the supposed virtues of this "new" socialism. The discussion can be read here, here, and here, where I write under the name of "Horzer". Take into account that at the moment (2005) I was still convinced of the validity of Marx´s "Labor Theory of Value" as a central justification for the necessity of Economic Democracy, which could not be the case anymore.

The last paragraph of this old page begs the question: is marksoc the system utilized in contemporary China?  David Schweickart seems to think so (Bertell Ollman ed., 1998, pg. 7-10), meaning that there is a difference between market socialism as he understands it and a specific kind that Sckweickart calls "worker-self-managed" market socialism.  Schweickart identifies three main characteristics of capitalism: it is a market economy (the prices and quantities of goods and services are determined in a free market), the means of production are privately owned (I would add that are owned by a capitalist that is entitled to its profits), and there is wage-labor.  In the case of a marksoc system, we obviously still have a market economy, but the means of production can be owned by the State or the workers.  The inclusion of the State in his definition brings him to the point alluded above: "It may or may not replace wage labor with workplace democracy, wherein workers get, not a contracted wage, but specified shares of an enterprise's net proceeds" (p. 10).  This strange laxity in Schweickart´s definition, is criticized by Kamram Nayeri in his review of this book, when he states that: "Schweickart (...) clearly is content to limit it {marksoc} to a society with a relatively more egalitarian distribution of resources and incomes".  If we believe that a marksoc economy must contemplate democracy in the workplace, as is the position of this blog, the Chinese system cannot be considered as market socialist unless most of the production is made in companies with this characteristic.  Only then can I equate marksoc with Economic Democracy.

Finally, I let to you to peruse the definition found nowadays in the Wikipedia page, and to make the changes that you, the reader, consider necessary to make it more exact and representative of the currents grouped under its wings.  All and every comment about this blog is welcomed, so fire away!

(To be fair with Schweikart, he recognized in a footnote that the Mondragon Coop. Corporation, a mostly worker-managed corporation, is a big influence in his work, but he immediately states that the example of China is "vastly more important".  This would be a main point of dissent with Hillel Ticktin in the same book)

Bibliography:


Bertell Ollman ed. (1998). Market Socialism: the Debate Among Socialists, with contributions by James Lawler, Hillel Ticktin and David Schewikart.
Nayeri, Kamram (2003): "Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists (book review)", Review of Radical Political Economics, 35, pg. 362.
Schweikart, David (1996): "Against Capitalism", Westview Press.